Derrick Wyatt talks to Radio Free Europe about Ukraine, Putin’s aims, and defending Europe without the US
Russia's "competitive advantage" is in nuclear weapons. The unknown is how that would translate into a practical advantage on the battlefield if Russia wanted to invade, say, the Baltics.
The interview was published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on its website in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. This is a revised version in English, published by Spanish think-tank Fide Foundation, here.
Headline quotations:
"Trump could deny aid to Ukraine, impose a so-called peace agreement, and allow Russia to keep the Ukrainian territory it holds. If the US abandoned the defence of Europe, Putin could see this as an opportunity to attack one or more of its NATO neighbours, relying on the threat or even the use of tactical nuclear weapons."
“Recently leaked Russian documents show that the loss of conventional military assets such as airfields in a conflict could trigger a tactical nuclear response by Russia.”
"Trump, like Putin, is unpredictable. If Trump thinks he has brought about 'peace' in Europe by forcing Ukraine to hand over some territory to Putin, he might react badly if the Russian President attacks one or more of the Baltic states."
“The big, serious question for Europe if it wants to defend itself against Russia without the help of the US, is whether it should increase its own nuclear arsenal - certainly tactically, and possibly strategically…. Does France want to increase its nuclear capability on the battlefield? Does, say, Poland want to acquire nuclear weapons?”
The Russian capture of Avdiivka, and a Ukrainian protected passage through the Black Sea
RFE/RL : It is the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and there is no end in sight to the war. Unlike last year, when Ukraine tried to launch a largely unsuccessful counteroffensive, Russia is now retaliating, but without significant penetration. However, there are fears that due to the absence of the necessary Western aid, Ukrainian forces will not be able to withstand Russian attacks for too long.
Wyatt : Reports suggest that the situation on the front is almost static. Little progress was made in the Ukrainian counter-offensive last year, because the Russian defences are strong.
Recently, Russian forces captured Avdiivka, which has partly symbolic and partly strategic significance. This city is important for holding two regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, in the east of Donbass.
One of Ukraine's successes has been securing a protected passage through the Black Sea. Ships use this corridor to export Ukrainian grain. The sea route passes through Romanian and Bulgarian territorial waters, and is also defended by Ukrainian onshore defence systems.
Putin wants to restore some variant of the Soviet Union
RFE/RL: What are Russia's goals? To secure the gains from the beginning of the invasion when she conquered most of the four regions, which she declared as parts of her state? Later, Russian troops were partially pushed out of these areas.
Does Russia have additional goals, namely to subjugate the greater part of Ukraine?
Wyatt: Putin's original goal was to conquer Ukraine and most likely install a puppet regime. This is clear because Russian forces were sent directly to attack Kiev.
Putin's short-term goal is to keep the parts of Ukraine that Russia seized in the current conflict and still holds. This would allow him to convince the Russian public that he had secured victory.
What is Putin's long-term goal? Maybe to create something like the former Soviet Union. Putin described the collapse of the USSR in 1991 as "the disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union", which he regrets.
He could reverse this disintegration either by annexing former members, or turning them into satellite states.
The conquest of Ukraine would certainly fit into such a plan, as does the semi-satellite status of Belarus.
If the recreation of the USSR in some form, and satellite states in the image of the old Warsaw Pact, then it is no surprise the governments of the Baltic States, and Moldova, have expressed anxiety about Putin’s plans. Russia already has a foothold in Moldova and Putin could be tempted to take things further.
RFE/RL: But to what extent is that realistic, because it would mean the return of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Baltic and Central Asian states under Moscow's auspices?
Wyatt : I am talking about Putin’s direction of travel rather than a blueprint. I don't think anything is inevitable. But if a good opportunity for Putin were to arise, such as the return of Trump to the White House, he might take that opportunity. Putin sees Trump as a potential friend, and he might be right.
Europe would have to double military aid to Ukraine to compensate for the loss of US support
RFE/RL : Ukraine's ability to defend and eventually push back Russian forces depends heavily on Western support. While the EU finally approved the €50 billion package, the $60 billion US aid is still on hold due to opposition from Republicans in the House of Representatives.
In the event that there is no change in unlocking US aid, what are the prospects for Ukraine to withstand Russian attacks and then launch a counter-offensive?
Wyatt: These questions are difficult because they depend on so many variables. With American help, Ukraine can withstand Russian attacks. She has showed that. Perhaps even without US help, if Europe's NATO allies do all they can, Ukraine could keep Russia from advancing much beyond the territories it currently controls.
But the European members of NATO would have trouble making up for the lack of American aid. So far, the total European military aid to Ukraine has been close to that of the US.
So making up for the loss of US aid on a permanent basis would mean European allies doubling their military support. This is possible if the political will is there, but there is no guarantee of that.
Use of frozen Russian assets by the allies
With or without American help, European NATO allies could use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. Most of these assets are located in Europe. British Foreign Minister David Cameron advocated this at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
Of course, there are no guarantees that Ukraine would be able to carry out a successful counter-offensive in which it would regain the occupied territory, even with American help.
Russian forces are dug in, with tank traps and minefields, which could make it impossible for Ukrainian forces to break through.
Frozen Ukraine conflict a bleak possibility
RFE/RL: How can the war in Ukraine end: as a truce, a frozen conflict, or a victory for one side?
Wyatt: Nothing which Russia agreed to would be set in stone as far as Russia was concerned.
A frozen conflict in which Russia continues to hold Ukrainian territory is a bleak possibility.
Trump might recognise Russian acquisitions if he tries to force a so-called peace deal on Ukraine and Ukraine refuses to accept it. This could lead to a real divide in attitude to Putin and to Russian gains between European allies and Trump’s US.
On the other hand, the US administration after Trump could distance itself from Trump. Europe’s NATO allies need to hold their nerve and realise that even if Trump is the next President of the US, a Republican or Democrat President which followed him (in 2028) could want to revert to a pro-NATO and pro-EU position.
A Russian attack on the Baltics possible but unlikely
RFE/RL: In the last two months, many European officials have expressed concern that, if Russia is not defeated in Ukraine, the next war is only a matter of time, that is, it could attack Georgia, Moldova or the Baltic states.
Is that danger real, or are these votes meant to bolster public support for increased funding for Europe's decades-neglected armies?
Wyatt: A Trump Presidency backing away from the defence of Europe might be seen by Putin as a window of opportunity to attack one or more of his NATO neighbours, relying on the threat, or even the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Recently leaked Russian documents show that the loss of conventional military assets such as airfields in a conflict could trigger a tactical nuclear response by Russia.
The danger of, say, an attack on Georgia, Moldova or the Baltics is real, but it is still unlikely. Russia’s war-fighting ability has been depleted. And Trump, as well as Putin, is unpredictable. If Trump thought he had forced “peace” on Europe by making Ukraine surrender some territory to Putin, he might react badly if Putin attacked one of the Baltics.
It is true that the threat of aggression by Putin is used to encourage more expenditure on defence by European countries. But the threat is real. More expenditure on defence is genuinely needed.
Would NATO hold together?
RFE/RL: In the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member, will the Alliance remain together given Trump's repeated statements, including the recent one, that the US could withdraw from it?
Wyatt: If Trump is in the White House and makes it clear that US forces will not act against Russians, then Europe’s NATO allies would try to stay together.
Most of the European allies are on track to allocate the promised two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence. Together, they have enough conventional military capabilities to strike hard at Russia, though not for very long, as their military supplies are depleted.
Russian military supplies are also depleted.
What if Russia invaded, say, the Baltic states and made it clear that it was ready to use nuclear weapons? Even such tactics by Putin would not protect his forces from synchronized NATO attacks with conventional weapons.
But the actual use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons could be a game changer. One or more NATO countries might back down.
Russia's advantage in nuclear weapons
RSE : Could Europe defend itself against a possible Russian attack, without the support of the USA?
Wyatt : In theory, Europe’s NATO allies could match Russia's conventional military firepower, at least for a while. European firepower is likely to increase in the coming years, if European allies live up to their commitments.
Russia's "competitive advantage" is in nuclear weapons. The unknown is how that would translate into a practical advantage on the battlefield if Russia wanted to invade, say, the Baltics.
Would Russia's first use of nuclear weapons in Europe have political negatives in relations with its allies, especially China? China has traditionally pursued a strong no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons. However, it seems to have recently watered down that policy.
The big, serious question for Europe if it wants to defend itself against Russia without the help of the US, is whether it should increase its own nuclear arsenal - certainly tactically, and possibly strategically.
When I say that it is a question for Europe, I mean, of course, that it is a question for individual European countries. Does France want to increase its capability in battlefield nuclear weapons? Does, say, Poland want to acquire its own nuclear weapons?
RFE/RL : Would France and Great Britain retaliate with a nuclear strike if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against the Baltic states?
Wyatt: I am convinced they would not.
The strategic nuclear arsenals of France and the UK are last-resort capabilities designed to destroy major Russian cities in retaliation for nuclear strikes on civilian centres in France and the UK.
Their existence is likely to deter Russia from nuclear attacks on France and the UK. But they would not deter Russia from using tactical nuclear weapons against, say, Poland or the Baltics.
Putin is pinning his hopes on a return of Trump to the White House
RFE/RL: What would such a war between Europe and NATO against Russia look like? Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently denied that his country is preparing for war with NATO, but that if it does happen, it will be "asymmetrical."
"Given the incommensurability of our military potential, we will simply have no choice. (Our) response will be asymmetrical. In order to protect the territorial integrity of our country, ballistic and cruise missiles with special warheads will be used. This is based on our military doctrine and all It is well known that if it comes to that, it will be an apocalypse, the end of everything," Medvedev said.
Wyatt: This statement by Medvedev, published by TASS in February, sounds like a justification for the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a direct conflict between NATO countries and Russia.
At one level it is a repeat of earlier statements made since the beginning of the conflict that Russia has more warheads than NATO including the US. These statements are designed to deter European politicians and public opinion from taking too assertive a stance against Russia. And let’s not forget that when Medvedev refers to the “territorial integrity of our country” he includes Crimea.
This statement offers the prospect of mutual destruction. But I don’t think Russia would want to provoke a strategic exchange with the USA.
At another level it might be looking forward to a Trump Presidency, when the US might take a back seat in NATO. “You European NATO allies would have no answer to Russian tactical nuclear weapons”, Medvedev might be warning.
A possible negative Trump reaction to the Russian attack on the Baltics
RFE/RL: Will Russia launch an attack on NATO considering that it considers the war in Ukraine part of its confrontation with it?
Wyatt : Only if Putin were sure that the US would not respond.
That could happen under a Trump Presidency. After Trump forced a settlement on Ukraine that gave Ukrainian territory to Russia, and signalled to Putin that the US would not defend Europe.
But Trump is unpredictable. It is not certain that Trump would be relaxed about Putin attacking a NATO neighbour after Trump had – in his mind – given peace to Ukraine and Europe by settling the Ukraine/Russian war.
Even in circumstances most favourable to Putin, it is not certain that he would decide to attack a NATO neighbour after his forces have suffered such losses and his military stocks are so low.
The special role of Poland and Finland
RFE/RL : In the event that the USA stays on the sidelines, who would bear the brunt in the event of a Russian attack: Poland, the Nordic countries, Germany, France, Great Britain? What about others like Italy, Spain, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey?
Wyatt : In theory, everybody, but some would be more active than others.
Expect Poland to be a keen player. Its geography puts it at the heart of any likely conflict. It spends more than 2% of its GDP on defence and it does not trust Russia.
It is estimated that “by the 2030s, Poland will have more tanks than the U.K., Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy combined.”
But how about battle-ready for, say, 2027? As of now Poland has 460 battle-ready tanks, including 29 US Abrams tanks delivered in January this year. This would be increased by some hundreds by 2027. Poland’s current defence minister has described Poland’s army as 187,000 strong. Poland has 48 modern fighter jets, and by the time it came to a conflict in Europe without US support it could likely muster about 150.
Some small countries could play a disproportionately large role. Finland has some impressive modern military hardware, a mobilised army of 280,000, and one of the strongest artillery forces in Europe.
In a NATO without the US, France would likely play an active role in expanding the EU’s defence role and pressing Germany to do the same. The invasion of Ukraine in any event seems to have led to a change of heart in Germany, a confession that Germany misread Putin, and a commitment to increased defence spending.
The UK would likely stick by its NATO commitments, looking to work closely with France and Germany. UK tank forces have in 2023 been training with German forces in Germany. In 2024 the UK will deploy 20,000 military personnel in NATO exercise “Steadfast Defender”.
Italy has recently upped its military spending and participated in a NATO nuclear-readiness exercise.
The rise of European populists weakens support for Ukraine
RSE: Will Europe remain united in the event of Russian aggression against, say, the Baltic states, or will it sacrifice them, counting on Russia not to further escalate the conflict, given the current political divisions within the EU, including the prospect of the rise of the far right in the upcoming elections for The European Parliament?
Wyatt: These are big questions, key questions, and in a way, unanswerable questions, because there are so many variables in the equation.
Far-right/populism is not a certain predictor of Putin-admiration or tolerance. Poland under a populist government increased its military strength and has put itself in good shape to resist Russian aggression.
Right-wing populist Giorgia Meloni is not a Putin fan, and the UK’s populist former leader Boris Johnson is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters and tries to win support for Ukraine in Republican circles.
That said, Orban of Hungary and Fico of the Slovak Republic are pro-Putin, as is Gert Wilders, though his role in a future Netherlands government might be less than decisive. I think that populist gains in national governments may be more worrying than gains in the European Parliament, but both could weaken Europe’s support for Ukraine and military response to Russian aggression.
It is far from certain that Europe would stay united if Russia attacked, say, the Baltics, and the US stayed on the sidelines.
The threat or use of nuclear weapons by Putin could stop some NATO countries in their tracks, because their leaders and their population would be seriously alarmed about the consequences for their armed forces and for their civilian populations. A battlefield nuclear weapon can be aimed at military bases or critical infrastructure like power stations, and cause mass destruction and numerous casualties.
The US is likely to reduce its presence in Europe in the future
RFE/RL: Taking into account Trump's statements and the overall turning of the US towards China as a priority, will Washington reduce its presence in Europe, that is, leave defence mainly to Europeans?
Wyatt : Quite apart from Trump, in the future the US is likely to reduce its presence in Europe. But reducing its presence does not necessarily mean pulling out altogether.
Even with its preoccupations elsewhere, it could still serve US interests to retain bases, forces, and nuclear weapons capability in Europe. European countries could provide bases for US operations elsewhere in the world. And if Russia has become a junior partner to China, that is a reason for containing Russia, not strengthening its capabilities by letting it take over European countries.
Putin wants the collapse of NATO
RFE/RL : What is Russia's ultimate goal when it comes to relations with NATO and is it possible to improve them somehow or is it impossible under these circumstances?
Wyatt : Putin's overall goal, as I said, is to restore something resembling the former USSR. There will be no agreement and settlement between NATO and Russia, unless Putin's successor renounces that goal, or the Alliance retreats in the face of Russian dominance.
Putin's Russia is guilty of aggression and war crimes against Ukraine, and Ukraine's allies in NATO and the EU consider it responsible for damage that is measured in hundreds of billions of euros.
Putin does not want a relationship with NATO, but its collapse, in law or in fact, and he hopes that Donald Trump could help him achieve this ambition.
A third world war is unlikely to result from the Ukraine conflict
RFE/RL : Are we on the verge of a third world war or a consensus on the basic principles on which the world should rest, or at least to enable some kind of coexistence?
Wyatt : Ukraine is unlikely to lead to a third world war, if you mean by that a NATO/Russia war leading to a strategic nuclear exchange involving the US and Russia Putin no doubt has many dark thoughts, but they mostly point to his self-promotion rather than martyrdom.
Where conflict over Taiwan could lead is another matter. I wouldn’t even tentatively comment on that.
There is no real consensus on how the world should be ordered.
What we mostly have right now is coexistence, punctuated by conflicts that tend to be contained rather than threatening entire populations. Maybe that's the best we can hope for.
Navalny represents the best of Russia
RFE/RL : Can the death of Alexei Navalny in any way affect the Kremlin's calculations when it comes to the war in Ukraine and relations with Europe in general?
Wyatt : Navalny’s death reminds us of the repressive measures which Putin has to take to secure his hold on power.
Navalny’s life, and his character, proves something that Navalny strongly believed in. That Putin is not Russia. That Russia’s finest (of which Navalny surely was one) would be the finest in any country.
And Navalny gives us a glimpse of what a new Russia could look like. A free Russia with a free press, strong action against corruption, prisons reserved for genuine criminals, inspirational leaders, like Navalny, who would be admired around the world, and not just at home. Navalny reminded us Russians need not be our enemies. They could and should be our close friends, allies and trading partners.
Of course, a democratic Russia could still be nationalistic and illiberal. But I suspect it would be more likely to seek practical links with the West, and that its people would expect more political rights as well as more economic benefits.
There is of course no set and guaranteed future for any country.
What I said about Navalny is a personal opinion, and an expression of hope that an open Russia would be more liberal and a friend to the West.
But I don’t see that coming in the short term.
Derrick Wyatt, KC, is Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Oxford, he was interviewed by Dragan Stavljanin, who is the foreign affairs editor of RFE/RL's Balkan Service.